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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework that considers the role played by moral hazard and the diversity
of networks and cultures in the choice of hiring channel. Our model explains why either informal or formal
hiring channels are preferred and either positive or negative wage differentials emerge for workers hired
through informal channels, depending on circumstances. We show that, conditional on being employed,
in favoritism contexts social networks are likely to be adopted as hiring channels for unskilled jobs and to
result in wage penalties and the more so the stronger the ties, while otherwise the opposite happens. We
then estimate an endogenous switching model for the case of Senegal’s manufacturing formal sector and
we find, consistently with our theoretical predictions in case of favoritism, that informal hiring channels
are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage penalty. Moreover, the probability
of having been hired through a social network and the absolute value of wage penalties are increasing
with the strength of ties.
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1 Introduction
The number of vacancies filled through informal hiring channels, which comprise family, friends,
and in general social networks to which individuals belong, rather than through the formal labor
market is impressive. Granovetter [1973], Rees [1966] and Corcoran [1980] found that about half
of the jobs in the United States were filled through personal contacts and Ioannides and Loury
[2004] notice that the role played by networks increased over time. Sociologists and economists
have first looked at the supply side of the labor market. Holzer [1988], for example, showed
that when multiple search methods are possible, workers prefer social networks to formal hiring
channels, because the former are less expensive and characterized by a higher probability of
being hired than the latter. On the demand side, the traditional wisdom among economists1
is that informal hiring channels may help to mitigate selection problems arising in recruitment.
For instance, Montgomery [1991], Saloner [1985] and Simon and Warner [1992] all argue that
informal hiring channels may reduce information asymmetry between employers and employees
and provide a better matching of unobservable characteristics. Montgomery assumes that social
networks are based on homophily of unobservable characteristics, so that people tend to refer
others like themselves. Saloner’s results rest instead on the referees’ willingness to safeguard
their reputation. Simon and Warner posit that the use of informal hiring channels reduces
employers’ uncertainty about applicants productivity.
All these models predict that hiring through social networks should always be preferred to
formal channels. Moreover, the enhanced selection that is guaranteed by informal hiring chan-
nels should be specially exploited for vacancies requiring high skills and should imply potential
wage premia for workers hired through social networks. However, in the real world, formal and
informal hiring channels coexist and their adoption greatly varies in different contexts. First
of all, the practice of hiring through social networks is even more pronounced in developing
countries than in industrialized ones.2 Moreover, many empirical studies suggest that vacancies
for unskilled occupations are more likely to be filled through social networks than jobs requiring
1For an interesting review of economic and sociological competing theories providing a rational for the use of
informal hiring channels, see Fernandez et al. [2000].
2See Ben-Porath [1980] and Fafchamps [2006], who suggests that reliance on interpersonal relationships and
networks can be seen as a symptom that formal institutions do not work well.
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high skills,3 while some find the opposite4. Finally, wage differentials imputable to informal
hiring channels are far from being always positive.5 For instance, Pellizzari [2009] finds that,
out of 15 industrialized countries, in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands networked workers
enjoy wage premia, in Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK they suffer wage penalties, while in the 8
remaining countries there are no significant wage differentials due to the adopted hiring channel.
The discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical studies suggest that theo-
ries focusing on signaling overlook some crucial aspect of the phenomenon. This paper aims at
reconciling theory and empirical findings on the choice of hiring channel and its potential effect
on wages. It does so, first of all by taking into account that, besides selection issues, incom-
plete information may also imply problems of moral hazard. Moreover, the existing theoretical
literature does not consider the variety of social networks, not even in their most fundamen-
tal dimension, i.e., their tightness6. The latter may however play an important role, because
tight networks are able to exert peer pressure to ensure proper behavior of members who are
hired through them.7 Indeed, Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] show that, when observing employees’
effort is costly for firms, employers need to increase workers’ expected value of not shirking
with respect to shirking. That is, firms need to rise either the monitoring or the salary of their
workers. However, the role played by peer pressure may decrease the monitoring costs for work-
ers hired through social networks with respect to other employees.8 Moreover, even networks
3See Rees [1966], Rees and Schultz [1970], Corcoran [1980], Banerjee [1984], Pistaferri [1999], Antoninis [2006],
Munshi and Rosenzweig [2006], and Pellizzari [2009].
4Kugler [2003], for example, argues that the use of referrals is more widespread in high-skilled occupations.
5While Simon and Warner [1992] and Kugler [2003] conclude that workers hired through social networks get
wage premia with respect to employees hired through formal channels, penalties are found by Pistaferri [1999]
and Bentolila et al. [2009].
6A tight network is characterized by very strong ties. Different concepts of strong ties populate the literature.
Hennig and Lieberg [1996] and Wahba and Zenou [2005] define strong ties as those based on a repeated and
regular relationship, while Grieco [1987], Lin [1999] and others measure the strength of the ties by the degree of
commitment, reciprocity, trust and mutual obligation. Our preferred notion is the one proposed by Granovetter
[1973]:
the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.
7Several studies support this insight. Adler and Kwon [2002] suggest that tight networks encourage compliance
with rules and reduce the need for formal controls. Similarly, Grieco [1987] argues that social networks can rein-
force social control at the work place. Moreover, Fisman [2003] provides evidence that enforcement is particularly
effective within ethnic groups in Africa. Finally, Glaeser et al. [1990], Barr [1999] and Miller and Rosenbaum
[1997] provide experimental evidence of the positive relationship between social proximity and trustworthiness.
8In enriching the employer search framework with the efficiency wage theory, we carry out a step along the
research path wished by Sicilian [1995]. In a similar spirit Kugler [2003] also argues that referees can exert peer
pressure on co-workers and thus lower monitoring cost, but within a matching framework.
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characterized by similar tightness may play a very different role in the job market depending on
the culture. There are contexts in which a worker hired through a social network reciprocates
the working opportunity by exerting more effort than workers hired through the formal chan-
nel, while a culture of favoritism encourages networked employees to work less than the others.
Our model integrates all these aspects and explains why either formal or informal hiring chan-
nels are adopted and why either positive or negative wage differentials may emerge for workers
hired through informal channels, depending on circumstances. Moreover, it accounts for the
stylized facts that developing countries rely even more on social networks as hiring channels
than industrialized ones and that informal hiring channels are often adopted to fill unskilled
vacancies.
The paper also contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the determinants of
hiring channels at worker, network and firm level and the impact of the adopted hiring channel
on wages in the Senegalese formal manufacturing sector. While most of the empirical literature
on social networks is largely confined to developed countries studies, very few studies have
analyzed the crucial role of social networks in less developed countries’ labor markets9 and
none takes into account the fact that social networks differ in their tightness. Moreover, to
our knowledge the only existing analysis concerning Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the colonial
period (Fafchamps and Moradi [2009]). However, this region is pervaded with informality to a
greater extent than other developing countries10 and social networks play a crucial role in their
labor markets11. At the same time, Senegal is a rare example of a Sub-Saharan African country
characterized by a dynamic economy moving away from the ubiquitous informality to a market
economy, thus providing a unique opportunity to investigate the remains of informality in an
economy that is developing toward formal markets.
We adopt an empirical approach that to our knowledge has not been applied yet to inves-
tigating informal hiring channels. Estimating an endogenous switching model, we find that
informal hiring channels are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage
9Notable exceptions are Egypt’s studies by Assaad [1997] and Wahba and Zenou [2005].
10An example of the economic relevance of informality in Africa is provided by Azam et al. [2001] concerning
the credit market.
11Luke and Munshi [2006] and Magruder [2010] find that traditional social networks, such as those based on
kinship, are pivotal for labor markets respectively in Kenya and South Africa. Barr and Oduro [2002] stress that
the importance of ethnic networks for labor outcomes in Ghana.
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penalty. Moreover, the probability of having been hired through a social network and the
absolute value of wage penalties is increasing with the strength of ties.
Section 2 analyzes the case of Senegal, providing details on the data and some descriptive
statistics characterizing sampled firms and workers. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework
that accounts for the elements intuitively singled out above and corroborated by the analysis
of rough data. Section 4 presents econometric evidence supporting the hypotheses and the
predictions of our theoretical framework. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis relies on the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey for Senegal,
run by the World Bank in 2003. It provides information about 262 firms and 1637 of their
workers in the formal12 manufacturing13 sector. One of the salient features of this data set is
that it matches workers and firms, which allows controlling for idiosyncratic characteristics of
both.
Social networks based on family, friends are the main channel of matching between firms
and workers in the dataset. On the demand side, the majority of firms use sometimes formal
and sometimes informal hiring channels, and 60% of the sampled firms declare to mainly rely
on informal networks in order to fill their vacancies. On the supply side, 65% of interviewed
workers found their job through social networks.14
In order to get some insights about the phenomenon, it is useful to go into a detailed analysis
of the characteristics of both firms and workers thoroughly. Some characteristics of the sampled
12The survey defines the formal sector as made up by registered firms. However, there are many other firms
that do not officially exist (and thus do not pay taxes). The latter firms make up the so-called informal sector
of the economy, which represents a notable part of the economy and employs a great number of workers. Data
available for 2001 indicate that it represented almost 55% of GDP and that about 1.2 million people worked in
informal firms. However, the informal sector of the economy is likely to hire almost only through social networks.
Thus, the formal sector is a more interesting ground to pin down the determinants of firms’ choices concerning
the hiring channel.
13The fact that sampled firms belong to the manufacturing sector implies that it is not possible to reach
conclusions about the Senegalese economy in general. However, the manufacturing sector is a large part of it,
accounting for 12% of GDP in 2008 (African Economic Outlook [2009]).
14Notice that the focus of this paper is on the hiring channel and not on the characteristics of the contract
hold by workers. Indeed, the ICA survey does not provide information on workers’ contract, i.e., whether it is
written and complete, whether it specifies benefits and social insurance, etc. However, Combarnous [2001] shows
that in Cøˆte d’Ivoire workers who found their job through informal channels usually have incomplete contracts,
while employees holding complete contracts often applied to a vacancy announcement.
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Firms mainly hiring through channel:
formal informal Difference Total
total number of interviewed firms 104 152 -48 256
firm located in Dakar 98 145 -47 243
public firm 8 4 4∗ 12
mean number of employees 194 72 122∗∗ 130
(592) (180) (51) (425)
owner and director 59 105 -46∗∗ 164
sector: agro-industry 40 53 -13 93
chemical/paint products 13 17 -4 30
building materials 10 8 2 18
furniture 1 5 -4 6
metals 10 15 -5 25
paper industry 12 24 -12 36
plastics 3 12 -9∗ 15
textile and leather 8 15 -7 23
wood 7 3 4∗ 10
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%
Table 1: Characteristics of sampled firms by their main hiring channels.
firms are reported in Table 1, which distinguishes between firms that declare to mainly rely
on formal and on informal hiring. All sampled firms are located in an urban area and 95% of
them in the capital city, reflecting the distribution of manufacturing employees in the country.15
Enterprises where the owner is also the director of the firm are also those that more often use
informal hiring channels, while bigger firms tend to rely more on formal hiring channels.
Having noticed these characteristics at the firm level, we now investigate the characteristics
of sampled workers.16 Table 2 reports available information about sampled employees, distin-
guishing between those hired through formal channels and those who found their job through
social networks. Workers who found their job through networks of relatives, friends are about
65% of interviewed workers. The survey also provides information concerning two types of social
networks. The first one is the network binding the owner or manager of the firm with employees
belonging to her ethnic group. The second one includes members of her extended family work-
ing in the firm. Rough data suggest that the ethnic group is one of the social networks whereby
workers may be hired, since employees that belong to the same ethnic group as the head of
15Indeed, more than 2 million people live in Dakar, while less than 250 thousands in the other cities. Thus,
the concentration in Dakar of interviewed workers is almost representative.
16Notice that the information available concerns neither the pool of applicants, nor just-hired workers, but
obviously workers employed at the time the survey took place.
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Workers hired through channel:
formal informal Difference Total
number of workers 555 1018 -463 1573
same ethnicity as firm’s head 71 214 -143∗∗∗ 285
same family as firm’s head 30 150 -120∗∗∗ 180
job: managers 32 23 9∗∗∗ 55
skilled white collar 101 71 30∗∗∗ 172
skilled blue collar 238 351 -113∗∗∗ 589
unskilled workers 183 569 -386∗∗∗ 752
mean education (years) 13.0 10.5 2.5∗∗∗ 11.4
(4.73) (4.62) (0.26) (4.81)
mean previous experience (years) 5.0 4.1 0.9∗∗∗ 4.5
(6.39) (6.06) (0.34) (6.19)
mean age at hiring (years) 29.9 28.8 1.1∗∗∗ 29.2
(7.41) (8.34) (0.42) (8.04)
gender: male 555 1018 -463 1573
marital status: married 555 1018 -463∗ 1573
origin: Dakar 220 426 -206 646
Senegal 311 546 -235 857
Other 24 45 -21 69
weekly work hours 43.2 43.3 -0.1 43.2
(8.51) (9.98) (0.50) (9.48)
mean ln real monthly salary 11.2 10.9 0.3∗∗∗ 11.0
(0.87) (0.86) (0.05) (0.88)
Note: Standard deviation in brackets. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%
Table 2: Characteristics of sampled workers by their hiring channel.
the firm are 21% among workers hired through an informal network and 13% in the formal
labor market. Since family ties are likely to be tighter than merely ethnic ones, the comparison
between their effects enables to test the role played by network tightness in the labor market.
Our data set provides evidence that workers are hired more often through social contacts
for jobs requiring lower qualifications. Indeed, 76% of unskilled workers found their job through
their family or friends. The percentage falls to 60% for skilled blue collars and to 41% for skilled
white collars and managers.17 Workers who found their job through informal contacts are also
less educated, experienced, and younger than employees hired on the formal labor market.
Finally, the mean of the natural logarithm of real monthly salary18 is significantly lower for
17The survey categorizes workers into ten types of jobs. We group them into four occupational categories: man-
ager, skilled white collar (engineer, scientist, economist, programmer, mathematician, accountant), skilled blue
collar and other skilled (technician, supervisor, maintenance and repairing man, medical staff, clerk, secretary)
and unskilled (other production worker, guard, cook).
18Real wages are computed adjusting reported salaries at the time of hiring for the harmonized consumer
price index, provided by the Senegalese Prevision and Statistics Direction (Direction de la Pre´vision et de la
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workers hired through social networks.
While the rigor of econometrics is necessary to disentangle the relative role played by different
variables, the analysis of crude data suggests several potentially relevant dimensions, which are
integrated in the theoretical framework developed in section 3. In particular, the incidence of
informal hiring channels varies with job characteristics and network tightness.
3 A Model of Hiring by the Informal Channel
The need of a theoretical framework accounting for what we observe in reality and in the data
described in section 2 motivates our modeling exercise. In order to understand the use of social
networks as hiring channels, the key point is investigating why and when firms and applicants
prefer to rely on them. Since adverse selection has long been investigated in the context of hiring
channel choice without managing to account for empirical evidence, we abstract from signaling
aspects for the sake of tractability and we focus instead on other crucial characteristics of the
phenomenon that received given little attention until now. Moreover, we simultaneously take
into account the choices of employers and applicants.
We model a formal-sector firm that can hire labor either through the formal channel, at a
market wage wF , or from a pool of workers who are linked to that firm by a social network.19
In the latter case, the wage is determined by the bargaining between the firm and the worker.20
Assume that the outcome is determined by the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (Rubin-
stein [1982]), so that the wage paid to a worker, when hired by the informal channel, maximizes
(wNi,j − wNi,j)ηi(wNi,j − wNi,j)1−ηi . In this function, ηi is the worker’s bargaining power, wNi,j is the
minimum wage that employee i is willing to accept through informal channels for working for
firm j, rather than only accepting jobs through formal channels, and wNi,j is the maximum wage
that the firm is prepared to pay this worker rather than hiring another one via the formal chan-
nel. The latter two variables are determined endogenously, as described below. In conclusion, if
Statistique).
19Table 5 in appendix A summarizes the variables introduced in the model.
20A vacancy posted through formal channels is likely to announce a wage. However, when informal hiring
channels are used, wage is much more likely to be the object of some negotiation and to depend on the bargaining
power of a specific candidate.
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the firm hires through informal channels, the corresponding wage will be determined as follows:
wNi,j = ηiw
N
i,j + (1− ηi)wNi,j . (1)
This expression simply says that the agreed wage will be a linear combination of the two extreme
points of the bargaining set, being closer to the top the higher is the worker’s bargaining power.
3.1 Determinants of the Break Point
We assume that the firm can observe worker’s individual output only by costly monitoring her.
For the sake of simplicity, the worker can either shirk or exert some effort, and that effort
may be influenced by how she was hired. A worker hired through the formal channel chooses
eFi ∈ {0, e}, while somebody hired though social networks eNi ∈ {0, e+ δϕi,j}. Indeed, the
characteristics of the social network whereby a worker is hired, and namely its tightness (ϕi,j),
are likely to influence the extent of her effort. In some contexts workers hired through social
networks may be eager to reciprocate the working opportunity, while elsewhere they may feel
that they don’t need to exert as much effort as the others (i.e., the sign of δ is cultural).
Denote qki,j the probability that worker i hired through channel k ∈ {F,N} gets fired by
firm j, and assume that the monitoring technology is such that the worker will only be fired
if she is caught shirking, which happens with probability µki,j when she does. The payoff of a
worker hired by the formal channel is:
UFi,j =
(
1− qFi,j
)
wF − γeFi
where γ is the per-unit cost of effort. However, a worker hired through a social network also
feels peer pressure by members of her hiring channel not to compromise its reputation. Indeed,
if she is caught shirking and fired, she will be punished by the network that served as hiring
channel to an extent that depends on its tightness. Therefore the payoff of a worker hired by
the informal channel is:
UNi,j =
(
1− qNi,j
)
(wNi,j + ζi,j)− γeNi − qNi,jϕi,j
8
where ζi,j is non-monetary gain that a worker may derive from working with or for a member of
her social networks. This parameter captures the benefits that the worker can get from being
an active member of the network, including gifts in special occasions like weddings and various
kinds of help.21
Lemma 1 (No-Shirking Conditions). When formal and informal channels are adopted the no-
shirking conditions are respectively:
µF ≥ γe
wF
(2)
µNi,j ≥
γ(e+ δϕi,j)
wNi,j + ζi,j + ϕi,j
(3)
Proof is provided in appendix A. The no-shirking conditions (2) and (3) suggest that the
intensity of monitoring that maximizes the firm’s profit depends on the chosen hiring channel.
This result is a direct consequence of the fact that the utility function of workers depends on
their hiring channel. Indeed, when a social network is adopted as hiring channel, its tightness
determines the level of monitoring inducing effort, as well as the cultural parameter δ. Moreover,
the larger the non-monetary benefit enjoyed by networked workers, the lower the monitoring
needed to induce their effort.
It can be readily checked that no-shirking conditions (2) and (3) will hold as an equality,
as this is the value of µki,j that maximizes the firm’s profit per worker. Assuming that labor
productivity is ϑ, and denoting ξj the unit cost of monitoring, the profit of firm j when hiring
worker i through formal and informal channels are respectively:
ΠFi,j = ϑe
F
i −
(
1− qFi,j
)
wF − ξjµF
such that eFi = e and q
F
i,j = 0 if µ
F ≥ γe
wF
, and eFi = 0 and q
F
i,j = µ
F if µF < γe
wF
;
ΠNi,j = ϑe
N
i −
(
1− qNi,j
)
wNi,j − ξjµNi,j
21The potential role played by non-pecuniary benefits is stressed in Fontaine [2007] and Bentolila et al. [2009].
It is likely that such benefits depend somehow on network tightness. However, the model is agnostic concerning
the specific functional form describing this potential relationship, since the latter is far from being obvious.
While this simplification entails that tightness explicitly appears only with a negative sign into the worker’s
utility function, the key point is of course accounting for the net impact of tightness on it.
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such that eNi = e + δϕi,j and q
N
i,j = 0 if µ
N
i,j ≥ γ(e+δϕi,j)wNi,j+ζi,j+ϕi,j , and e
N
i = 0 and q
N
i,j = µ
N
i,j if
µNi,j <
γ(e+δϕi,j)
wNi,j+ζi,j+ϕi,j
.
Therefore, per worker profit when the firm hires through respectively formal and informal
channel may simply be written as:
ΠFj = ϑe− wF − ξj
γe
wF
(4)
ΠNi,j = ϑ(e+ δϕi,j)− wNi,j − ξj
γ(e+ δϕi,j)
wNi,j + ζi,j + ϕi,j
(5)
which of course have to be non-negative, so that there exist a wNi,j max, a w
F
min, and a w
F
max.
In the sub-game perfect equilibrium, workers hired through formal and informal channels
know that the firm will respectively choose µF = γe
wF
and µNi,j =
γ(e+δϕ)
wNi,j+ζi,j+ϕi,j
, so that their
payoff is in fact:
UF = wF − γe (6)
and
UNi,j = w
N
i,j + ζi,j − γ(e+ δϕ) (7)
We are now in a position to determine the break point
[
wNi,j , w
N
i,j
]
of the bargaining problem
in proposition 1, whose proof is provided in appendix A.
Proposition 1 (Bargaining Set). The upper and lower bound of the bargaining set are deter-
mined as follows:
1. the firm prefers hiring through social networks worker i if wNi,j ≤ wNi,j, where wNi,j is the
maximum of wNi,j fulfilling:
− ϑδϕi,j + wNi,j + ξj
γ(e+ δϕi,j)
wNi,j + ζi,j + ϕi,j
≤ wF + ξj γe
wF
(8)
2. the worker will accept a job from the informal channel if:
wNi,j ≥ wNi,j = wF − ζi,j + γδϕi,j (9)
10
Proposition 1 thus specifies the acceptable range of values of the informal wage for making
a transaction by this channel. If the monitoring cost is relatively low and the cultural context is
such that workers hired through social networks are willing to exert extra effort to reciprocate
(δ > 0), the upper bound is increasing with network tightness, reciprocity, and productivity.
If instead networked workers exert less effort than employees hired through the formal channel
(δ < 0), the upper bound is decreasing with network tightness, extent of favoritism (the absolute
value of δ), and productivity.
At the other end of the range, the lower bound is the smaller the larger the non-monetary
benefits that the worker gets from this informal transaction. When workers hired through
social networks are eager to reciprocate the working opportunity, the lower bound increases
with network tightness, while it decreases when networked workers exert less effort.
3.2 The Choice of the Hiring Channel
For the firm to hire through the informal channel, such a transaction must be worthwhile for
both the firm and the worker. In other words, as a familiar saying suggests, ‘it takes two for
tango’. Figure 1, which depicts the set determined by proposition 1, makes clear that this
condition may fail if either the firm, or the worker, is not interested in making that transaction.
For example, if the market wage is higher than ŵF , defined as the point where wNi,j and w
N
i,j
coincide, workers do not want a job through social networks because firms are not willing to
pay them enough through such a hiring channel. Only within the area labeled ‘informal hiring
channel’ both sides are willing to strike a bargain by the informal channel.
This remark allows us to establish the following proposition
Proposition 2 (Choice of Hiring Channel). When δ > 0 (i.e., in a culture of gratitude),
1. informal hiring channels will be used:
• always if ϑ ≥ γ − ζi,j/δϕi,j, or
• only when wF is below the threshold level ŵF if ϑ+ ζi,j/δϕi,j < γ;
2. informal and formal hiring channels are indifferent if ϑ+ ζi,j/δϕi,j < γ and wF = ŵF ;
3. formal hiring channels will be used otherwise.
11
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Figure 1: The choice of hiring channel and the wages of workers hired through formal and
informal hiring channels.
When δ < 0 (i.e., in a culture of favoritism),
1. informal hiring channels will be used:
• always if γ ≥ ϑ+ ζi,j/δϕi,j, or
• only when wF is below the threshold level ŵF if γ − ζi,j/δϕi,j < ϑ;
2. informal and formal hiring channels are indifferent if γ − ζi,j/δϕi,j < ϑ and wF = ŵF ;
3. formal hiring channels will be used otherwise.
Indeed, only informal hiring channel are used when the area labeled ‘informal hiring channel’
becomes open-ended, that is when either ζi,j > ϕi,jδ(γ − ϑ) or, if ζi,j → 0, when δ(γ − ϑ) ≤ 0.
Intuitively, the first condition suggests that social networks prevail as hiring channel when
non-monetary gains from informal hiring are substantial. Since in developing countries social
networks are often very important and informal exchanges widespread, the relative weight of
non-monetary benefit versus salary may be substantial. Therefore, our theoretical framework
predicts that informal hiring channels should be even more common in developing countries than
12
in industrialized countries. At the same time, since the same non-monetary gain will impact on
workers’ utility more if their salary is lower, our model also implies that social networks should
be more often adopted as hiring channel for less skilled jobs.
Even when networks do not provide a high non-monetary gain, only informal hiring channels
are adopted if ϑ ≥ γ when δ > 0 and if γ ≤ ϑ when δ > 0. Indeed, if the spread between
productivity and cost of effort of a worker is increasing with her skills, our framework predicts
that informal hiring channels should be preferred to fill skilled vacancies, when the culture is
such that a worker hired through a social network reciprocates the working opportunity by
exerting more effort than workers hired through the formal channel (δ > 0). At the same
time, in contexts of favoritism (δ < 0) they should be preferred for unskilled jobs, while skilled
vacancies should be filled through formal channels.
3.3 The Wage Differential
Figure 1 shows that the stronger the willingness to reciprocate a job opportunity obtained
through social networks, the tightness of the social network adopted as hiring channel, and the
bargaining power of a worker (i.e., wNi,j close to w
N
i,j), the higher tend to be the wage of a worker
hired through informal channels. The opposite is true the stronger the culture of favoritism,
the tighter the social network adopted as hiring channel, and the weaker the bargaining power
(i.e., wNi,j close to w
N
i,j). Moreover, when the bargaining power is limited, the salary earned
by workers hired through the informal channel decreases with the non-monetary gain workers
enjoy, while, if networked employees have strong bargaining power, the effect is weaker and the
more so the larger the non-monetary gains.
We now formally assess whether workers hired through the informal channel get a wage
premium or a wage penalty with respect to employees hired through the formal channel.
Proposition 3 (wage differential). When δ > 0,
1. both wage premium and penalty are possible, depending on the bargaining power, if ζi,j >
γδϕi,j;
2. only wage premium to workers hired through social networks is possible if ζi,j < γδϕi,j.
When δ < 0,
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1. both wage premium and penalty are possible, depending on the bargaining power.
Proposition 3 suggests that depending on the parameter values, informal hiring channels
may have either positive or negative consequences on salaries, as suggested by the empirical
literature discussed in section 1. In particular, wage penalties should be more likely in contexts
of favoritism and wage premia in the opposite case.22 Even in case of low bargaining power,
workers hired through social networks earn for sure wage premia when they reciprocate the
working opportunity by exerting more effort than workers hired through formal channels if
non-monetary gain don’t exist. In such a culture, the value of wage premia are ceteris paribus
positively affected by network tightness and the intensity of reciprocity. On the other hand,
in contexts of favoritism, workers hired through informal hiring channels can get wage premia
only if the bargaining power is particularly strong.
4 Econometric analysis of hiring channel choice and wage dif-
ferentials
We exploit the Senegalese data to investigate the determinants of hiring channel choice and
wage differentials imputable to the hiring channel.23 A fundamental concern undermines the
analysis: is the hiring channel choice exogenous to unobservable determinants of wage? If
hiring channel and salary share some unobservable determinants, sample selection24 biases the
estimation of coefficients. If for instance less able individuals are more likely to be hired through
social networks than through formal channels and therefore receive lower wages ceteris paribus,
then failing to control for this correlation would yield biased estimates of the impact of hiring
channel on wages.
Besides the potential sample selection bias, a further concern is that the hiring channel may
have an indirect impact on the salary through the standard wage determinants. For example, the
role played by a worker’s education on her wage may be weaker for an applicant hired through
22Interestingly enough, Pellizzari [2009] finds wage penalties in Italy and wage premia in countries like Belgium
and the Netherlands.
23It would be very interesting to test our theoretical insights concerning the role played by informal hiring
channels in different institutional contexts, but a systematic cross-country comparison is beyond the purposes of
this paper.
24Sample selection is an issue because we observe wages of workers hired through a social network only when
they were hired through that channel (and never if they were hired through formal channels).
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social networks than for one hired on the formal labor market. The econometric framework
addressing endogenous sample selection and switching impact that wage determinants may have
for workers hired through different channels is the endogenous switching model (see Heckman
[1979]). Roughly speaking, it is a treatment effect model that allows for a full set of interaction
terms between hiring channel and wage determinants. Details on the endogenous switching
econometric model are given in appendix B.
4.1 Specification of estimation
To take advantage of the richness of available data, we take into account not only variables at the
individual level as in the standard endogenous switching model, but also firms’ characteristics.25
Therefore, the system of equations of interest is as follows:
ln wFi,j = β
F
workerXi + β
F
firmΞj + ²
F
i,j (10)
ln wNi,j = β
N
workerXi + β
N
firmΞj + ²
N
i,j (11)
H∗i,j = γZi,j + ui,j (12)
where the dependent variable of the wage regressions is the natural logarithm of the real monthly
wage, Xi are the regressors at worker i level, Ξj the characteristics of firm j, and Zi,j includes
Xi, Ξj and variables that allow identification. In particular, vector Xi is represented by worker
i’s years of education and experience before last hiring, gender, marital status, place of origin,
number of hours worked per week,26 type of vacancy filled when hired, whether worker i is a
relative of firm’s manager or owner, or does not, but belongs to her ethnic group. Vector Ξj
includes firm j’s size, sector, and three dummy variables taking unit value respectively if firm j
25Since our focus is on the choice of the hiring channel, variables should refer to the hiring time of each
worker. Even though some variables explicitly refer to that time (hiring channel, type of job, salary and previous
experience), the large majority of them concerns the year of the survey. However, some information obtained in
2003 may well approximate several variables at the hiring time. For instance, the years of education declared at
the time of the survey are likely to correspond to the years of education at hiring time. Therefore, we assume
that some variables at the firm (size, direction, sector, location, public capital) and the worker level (years of
education, hours of work and marital status) are good proxies for their value at the time hiring occurred.
26We run the same estimation using the hours of work per week to obtain the wage rates from the monthly
salaries. The results are identical, the only difference being that the significance of some variables slightly
increases. However, we present the results obtained for monthly wages in order to avoid any concern of propagation
of potential measurement errors from hours of work to the dependent variable.
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is located in Dakar, if a large share of its capital belongs to the State, and if its owner personally
runs the firm.
While the available data allow controlling for a great variety of observable characteristics
both at worker and firm level, it may still be the case that some unobserved characteristics
differ between individuals hired through different hiring channels. The best available exclusion
restriction is a dummy taking unit value when a worker was over 40 years old when hired. The
identifying assumption is that this variable is legitimately excluded from wage regressions (10)
and (11), but significant in the selection equation (12). While by definition this hypothesis is
not testable, economic reasoning supports our choice of this exclusion restriction. Indeed, it is
standard27 to posit that age should not be relevant in a wage determination once experience
and education are accounted for. At the same time, our theoretical framework is consistent
with the hypothesis that relatively old people that look for a job are more likely to be hired
through informal rather than formal channels in contexts of favoritism.28
Finally, the observed dichotomous realization of the latent variable H∗i,j is whether each
sampled worker was hired through social networks (Hi,j = 1) or not (Hi,j = 0):
Hi,j =
 1 if H
∗
i,j > 0
0 otherwise
4.2 Econometric results
Table 3 shows the results for the simultaneous estimation of equations (10), (11), and (12).29
The first part of the table reports the coefficients of the determinants of the hiring channel,
which correspond to the vector of parameters γ in equation (12). The determinants of salary
for workers hired through social networks, corresponding to βN s in equation (11), are reported
in the second part of the table in the first column. Those for employees hired through formal
channels, corresponding to βF s in equation (10), are presented in the second column.
Table 3 clearly indicates that the use of social networks as hiring channel greatly varies
27Hayashi [2000] precisely cites age as example of a good instrument for wage regressions including education
and experience in the section dedicated to endogeneity bias of his textbook on Econometrics (pages 199-200).
28Indeed, the burden of reconversion tends to decrease the spread between their productivity and their cost
of effort with respect to younger applicants. Moreover, it is also possible that people over 40 have tight social
networks available, so that γ ≥ ϑ+ ζi,j/δϕi,j is likely to more strongly hold than for younger workers.
29The standard errors reported in table 3 are adjusted for intra-firm correlation.
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with the type of vacancy to be filled, a stylized fact described in section 1. Unskilled workers
have a significantly higher probability of being hired through social networks than skilled blue
collars, while the opposite is true for skilled white collars. Such result verifies the theoretical
implications of the model that are developed in section 3.2. If the spread between productivity
and cost of effort of workers is decreasing with their skills, and the potential non-monetary
gains quite large with respect to unskilled workers’ monetary wage, networks are likely to be
adopted as hiring channel despite favoritism, while the opposite is true for skilled white collar
workers. Managers are not significantly more likely to be hired through formal rather than
informal channels, probably because the two countervailing effects, namely large non-monetary
benefits and high productivity combined with very costly monitoring, compensate each other.
The coefficients of the wage regressions show that a worker earns significantly more if hired as
manager or a skilled white collar and less if hired as unskilled worker than if she is hired as
skilled blue collar, consistently with what intuition suggests, whatever the hiring channel.
One peculiar determinant of the salary results to be the type of social network whereby a
worker was hired. A relative of the owner or manager of the firm ceteris paribus has significantly
Choice of informal hiring channel
job: manager -0.458 (0.287)
skilled white collar -0.336∗∗ (0.145)
unskilled 0.252∗∗ (0.112)
same family as firm’s head 0.476∗∗∗ (0.151)
only same ethnicity as firm’s head 0.081 (0.154)
education (years) -0.030∗∗ (0.012)
previous experience (years) -0.063∗∗∗ (0.019)
previous experience sq. (years) 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
age over 40 at hiring 0.304∗∗ (0.141)
origin: Dakar -0.054 (0.265)
Senegal -0.215 (0.266)
married 0.108 (0.092)
gender: male -0.042 (0.114)
hours worked 0.005 (0.005)
firm located in Dakar -0.397∗ (0.211)
ln of n.employees -0.110∗∗∗ (0.039)
owner and director 0.110 (0.110)
TFP at hiring 0.015 (0.156)
public firm 0.051 (0.253)
intercept 1.260∗∗∗ (0.469)
sector dummies yes
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Wage regression
for workers hired through: social networks formal channel
job: manager 0.629∗ (0.335) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.107)
skilled white collar 0.436∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.197∗∗ (0.101)
unskilled -0.434∗∗∗ (0.075) -0.192∗∗ (0.087)
same family as firm’s head -0.297∗∗ (0.133) -0.216∗ (0.115)
only same ethnicity as firm’s head 0.025 (0.089) 0.178 (0.113)
education (years) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.057∗∗∗ (0.009)
previous experience (years) 0.043∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.025∗ (0.015)
previous experience sq. (years) -0.002∗∗ (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
origin: Dakar 0.134 (0.217) 0.040 (0.259)
Senegal 0.100 (0.074) 0.044 (0.257)
married 0.100 (0.074) 0.162∗∗∗ (0.066)
gender: male -0.019 (0.083) 0.064 (0.087)
hours worked 0.000 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004)
firm located in Dakar 0.654∗∗∗ (0.215) 0.721∗∗∗ (0.190)
ln of n.employees 0.132∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.058∗∗ (0.029)
owner and director -0.126∗ (0.073) -0.052 (0.073)
TFP at hiring 0.360∗∗∗ (0.120) 0.477∗∗∗ (0.126)
public firm -0.037 (0.230) -0.010 (0.131)
intercept 9.675∗∗∗ (0.328) 9.000∗∗∗ (0.398)
sector dummies yes yes
ρN -0.747∗∗∗ (0.256)
ρF -0.142 (0.270)
Log-likelihood -1844.84
Wald χ226 128.49
N 1139
Note: In brackets Robust Standard Errors, clustered by 239 firms.
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 3: Endogenous switching model: determinants of the choice of hiring channel and of the
wage for workers hired through formal and informal hiring channels.
greater chances of being hired through informal hiring channels. At the same time, relatives
suffer a substantial wage penalty.30 The role played by kinship, possibly the tightest existing
network, reflects the theoretical prediction of our framework that the tighter the social network
that serves as hiring channel, the larger the potential wage penalties suffered by networked
workers, in contexts where favoritism is widespread.
Longer education is associated with a lower probability of being hired through social net-
works and the use of informal hiring channels is a decreasing and convex function of experience
30Since we do not separately observe the hiring choices of firms and applicants, but only the outcome of their
joint decisions (i.e., that someone is working for a firm), some caution is needed in interpreting these results.
However, the magnitude of coefficients undoubtedly points to their consistency with a context of favoritism.
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prior hiring.31 This feature is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical framework that
larger productivity increases the incidence of formal channels. Education and experience, the
classical Mincerian wage determinants, as expected significantly increase wages, whatever the
hiring channel whereby a worker was hired.
An interesting result is that, even controlling for workers’ experience, people over 40 years
old are significantly more likely to have found their job through informal rather than formal
channels. Our theoretical framework helps to intuitively understand the widely recognized
phenomenon that elder people seldom get a job on the formal labor market. In fact, the burden
of reconversion of their competences, which is required by a new working environment, tends
to increase their cost of effort with respect to younger workers, so that formal hiring channels
are hardly used despite favoritism, while peer pressure consequent to the adoption of informal
hiring channels may compensate it.
We control for marital status, which is not a significant determinant of the hiring channel
and does not affect wages of workers hired through social networks. However, workers hired on
the formal labor market enjoy significantly higher wages if they are married. Workers’ gender,
place of origin, and hours worked per week are maintained as control variables at the individual
level, but they are never significant.
Table 3 also shows that there are a number of firms’ characteristics affecting the choice of
the hiring channel and the wage. The location of a firm in Dakar rather than in other towns
decreases the likelihood of hiring somebody through informal hiring channels.32 At the same
time, employees working in a firm in Dakar gain significantly higher wages.33
The size of the firm, in terms of total number of employees, has a significantly negative
impact on the probability of being hired through informal channels and a positive one on
wages.34 This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, since in small firms the recruiter
31The same result is found for example by Pistaferri [1999].
32This finding is coherent with the view that big cities entail weaker social networks, an idea that dates back to
the nineteenth century (see Tonnies [1887] and Simmel [1903]) and was developed by the social disorganization
theory (see Wirth [1938], Redfield [1947] and Alexander [1973]) and the overload theory (see Milgram [1970]).
For a short and enlightening discussion on the topic in Sociology, see Amato [1993].
33While the qualitative result is intuitive, the magnitude of the coefficients needs to be taken cum grano salis,
since 96% of sampled employees work in Dakar.
34Pistaferri [1999] also finds that large firm are less likely to hire through informal channels and pay higher
wages. More in general, the fact that larger firms tend to pay higher wages is a well-established finding (see for
instance Oi and Idson [1999]).
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and the employees tend to work closely, while in large firms peer pressure is less effective.
Workers employed by a firm run by its owner are not significantly more likely to be hired
through social networks, but they earn less ceteris paribus. Indeed, a manager may get positive
utility out of hiring people belonging to her social networks, even in cases when the choice of
informal hiring channels does not maximize the firm’s expected profit, and may hire too often
workers through their social networks. Instead, the utility of a director who is also the owner
directly depends also on firm profit and principal-agent distortions are avoided: she uses her
social networks as hiring channel only when convenient and she pays her networked employees
what is needed to induce their effort and nothing more than that.
To account for time effects due to the fact that surveyed workers were hired in different years,
we control for the total factor productivity change, which is as expected positively strongly
correlated with salaries. Finally, we control for firms’ public capital and sector.
At the bottom of Table 3 are reported the estimated correlation coefficients between residuals
of the regression for the choice of the hiring channel and for wages. The correlation between the
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Figure 2: True distribution of wages for workers hired through informal hiring channels and
distribution of unconditional and conditional expected wages for the same subsample of workers.
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residuals of the selection equation (12) and the wage regression for workers hired through formal
channels (10), ρF , is not significantly different from zero. However, the correlation between the
residuals of the selection equation and the wage regression for workers hired through informal
channels (11), ρN , is significantly negative. Therefore, selection is endogenous and, in particular,
workers hired through social networks ceteris paribus suffer a significant wage penalty due to
unobservable determinants.
A visual way to see the wage penalty due to unobservable factors that is suffered by workers
who got their job through social networks is to compare the true distribution of wage earned
by workers hired through informal channels with the unconditional expected wage for the same
subsample, i.e., E (ln wNi,j) = β̂NworkerXi + β̂NfirmΞj . Figure 2 shows that the true distribution
of wages of the subsample of workers hired through informal channels is shifted towards lower
wages with respect to the unconditional wage distribution predicted for the same workers.
However, the distribution of expected wages for the subsample of workers hired through social
networks conditional on the dependent variable being observed, i.e., E (ln wNi,j |Hi,j = N) =
β̂NworkerXi+ β̂
N
firmΞj + σ̂N ρ̂Nf(γ̂Zi,j)/F (γ̂Zi,j), fits quite well the true distribution of wages for
the same subsample. The difference between the unconditional and the conditional expected
wage distribution is precisely the negative selection effect of informal hiring channels.
In order to reach a conclusion about whether overall informal hiring channels imply on aver-
age wage penalties in the Senegalese manufacturing sector, the switching impact of observable
wage determinants has to be taken into account, too. We therefore compare the estimated
parameters β̂N and β̂F of Table 3 to asses whether the differences are statistically significant.
Table 4 shows that informal hiring channels also entail a wage penalty due to observable deter-
minants, but only through the switching impact of unskilled jobs.
Jointly considering our results concerning the unobservable and observable wage determi-
nants for workers hired through social networks and formal channels, we can conclude that the
former ones suffer a significant wage penalty.
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β̂N − β̂F
job: manager 0.143 (0.428)
skilled white collar 0.239 (0.210)
unskilled -0.242∗∗ (0.113)
same family as firm’s head -0.082 (0.254)
only same ethnicity as firm’s head -0.153 (0.175)
education (years) -0.017 (0.056)
previous experience (years) 0.018 (0.040)
previous experience sq. (years) -0.001 (0.002)
origin: Dakar 0.094 (0.328)
Senegal 0.056 (0.425)
married -0.062 (0.119)
gender: male -0.083 (0.134)
hours worked -0.004 (0.028)
firm located in Dakar -0.067 (0.335)
ln of n.employees 0.074 (0.078)
owner and director 0.074 (0.110)
TFP at hiring -0.117 (0.170)
public firm -0.027 (0.239)
intercept 0.675 (2.538)
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors in brackets. Significance levels: *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%
Table 4: Switching impact of the hiring channel on wages: difference between estimated coeffi-
cients of wage determinants for workers hired through informal and formal channels.
5 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the role played by social networks as hiring channel and on wage dif-
ferentials between employees hired through formal and informal hiring channels. It contributes
to the theoretical literature on informal hiring channels and to the empirical literature on social
networks as hiring channels in developing countries.
From a theoretical point of view, we focus on the role played by moral hazard and allow
for heterogeneity of networks’ tightness. Our framework helps to interpret the fact that firms
and workers rely sometimes on formal hiring channels and sometimes on informal ones and the
rather mixed findings of the empirical literature on the impact that the hiring channel has on
wages. In particular, the choice of the hiring channel varies with country’s development and
culture, with the characteristics of networks available as hiring channel and with the type of
vacancy to be filled. In contexts of favoritism social networks are predicted to be mainly adopted
as hiring channel to fill unskilled vacancies; moreover, such jobs may be associated with wage
22
penalties and the more so the tighter the network that served as hiring channel. However, when
skilled workers are hired through informal hiring channel, they are likely to get wage premia,
and the more so the tighter the network.
We empirically verify the implications of the model in the particularly interesting case of
the Senegalese formal manufacturing sector. While the analysis of a single country does not
allow to study the relationship between the development of formal institutions and the use
of informal hiring channels, this paper could be the first step in further research on the cross-
country analysis, since similar surveys exist for many countries. Our econometric results support
the theoretical predictions that, conditional on being employed, when favoritism is widespread
social networks are often exploited as hiring channel for unskilled jobs and when non-monetary
gains are likely to be large, like in the case of relatives of the firm’s head or in small firms.
Formal hiring channels are instead adopted for filling skilled vacancies and when the required
competences are higher. Finally, we find that workers hired through whatever informal channel
suffer a wage penalty. Wage determinants are the standard ones (worker’s education, experience
and type of job, and firm’s location and size), but belonging to a very tight network decreases
wages, which of course may be at least partly compensated by larger non-monetary gains.
From a policy perspective, it is therefore important not only to investigate whether workers
hired through social networks have wage penalties or premia imputable to their hiring channel,
but also to understand the extent of non-monetary benefits that they may enjoy. Moreover,
wage differentials crucially depend on the bargaining power of workers and firms, so that the
latter could represent a lever for policy intervention. In conclusion, informal hiring channels
may be beneficial for everyone, but it is necessary to make sure that employment is accessible
through formal channels as well.
Further research could take into account some peculiar features implied by the use of the
extended family as a hiring channel. For instance, family ties not only are very tight, but also
provide almost full commitment among its members. If the chief of a firm guarantees employ-
ment to her relatives, the pooling of business risk35 within the family should be considered, too.
A fundamental step would be taking into account the multi-dimensionality of concerns arising
35Several empirical studies find evidence of risk pooling within highly clustered networks in African countries
(see for example Barr [2002]).
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from incompleteness of information in the labor market and developing a theoretical framework
that takes simultaneously into account moral hazard and selection problems. The predictions
of a such model could then be empirically tested in order to disentangle the relative weight of
the two.
A Theoretical Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Worker i chooses whether to shirk (i.e., eki = 0) or not (i.e., e
F
i = e or
eNi = e+ δϕi,j by maximizing her utility.
If she was hired through formal channels, she does not shirk if wF − γe ≤ (1− µF )wF .
Therefore, the no-shirking condition for workers hired on the formal labor market is (2).
If she was hired through a social network, she does not shirk if wNi,j + ζi,j − γ(e + δϕi,j) ≤(
1− µNi,j
)
(wNi,j + ζi,j)− µNi,jϕi,j , i.e., if condition (3) is satisfied.
Proof of proposition 1. For informal hiring channel to arise, both the firm and the worker should
prefer it:
1. the firm prefers hiring worker i through social networks, if per worker profits when hiring
through informal channels (5) are greater than or equal to per worker profits when hiring
through formal ones (4):
ϑ(e+ δϕi,j)− wNi,j − ξj
γ(e+ δϕi,j)
wNi,j + ζi,j + ϕi,j
≥ ϑe− wF − ξj γe
wF
.
Therefore,
−ϑδϕi,j + wNi,j + ξj
γ(e+ δϕi,j)
wNi,j + ζi,j + ϕi, j
≤ wF + ξj γe
wF
and wNi,j is the maximum of w
N
i,j fulfilling this condition.
2. the worker will accept a job from the informal channel if her utility (7) is greater than or
equal to what she could get if she was hired through the formal channel (6):
wNi,j + ζi,j − γ(e+ δϕ) ≥ wF − γe
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wNi,j ≥ wNi,j = wF − ζi,j + γδϕi,j .
Variable Support Index
k Hiring channel k ∈ {F,N}
ηi Worker’s bargaining power 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1 i = 1, ..., n
γ Worker’s cost of effort γ > 0
eki Worker’s effort e
F
i ∈ {0, e}, k ∈ {F,N} and i = 1, ..., n
eNi ∈ {0, e+ δϕi,j}
ϑ Productivity of effort ϑ > 0
ζi,j Non-monetary benefit ζi,j ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., nand j = 1, ...,m
ϕi,j Network tightness 0 < ϕi,j ≤ 1 i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
δ Cultural factor δ ∈ (−∞,+∞)
µki,j Probability of monitoring 0 ≤ µki,j ≤ 1 k ∈ {F,N}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
ξj Unit cost of monitoring ξj > 0 j = 1, ...,m
qki,j Probability of firing 0 ≤ qki,j ≤ 1 k ∈ {F,N}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
wki,j Worker’s salary w
k
i,j > 0 k ∈ {F,N}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
Table 5: Description of variables used in the theoretical framework (section 3).
B Empirical Appendix
Endogenous switching models can be estimated one equation at a time either by two-step
least square or maximum likelihood estimation. However, both of these estimation methods
are inefficient. An efficient alternative is the full information maximum likelihood method
(FIML) that simultaneously estimates binary and continuous parts of the model.36 Endogenous
switching models describe the behavior of an agent with two regression equations, and a criterion
function that determines which regime of wages the agent faces:
ln wFi = β
FXi + ²Fi (13)
ln wNi = β
NXi + ²Ni (14)
H∗i = γZi + ui (15)
36FIML involves forming the joint distribution of the random variables characterizing the equations of the model
and then maximizing the full log-likelihood function. In this paper the estimation of the switching regression
model and the counterfactuals are based on the FIML algorithm implemented as a Stata program (movestay) by
Lokshin and Sajaia [2004].
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where wFi is the wage of individual i who was hired through a formal channel, while w
N
i is
the wage of individual i who was hired through some social network. H∗i is the latent variable
that determines the hiring channel of individual i. Xi is a vector of individual characteristics
that is thought to influence the individual wage, while Zi is a vector of characteristics that
influences the decision regarding the hiring channel. The vector parameters are βN , βF , and γ.
The disturbance terms are ²Fi , ²
N
i , and ui. Notice that the impact of the hiring channel does
not show up as a dummy variable in wage regressions, but rather in the fact that the constant
term and the β-parameters may differ from the sample of workers hired through formal channels
to the sample of workers hired through social networks (i.e., βN 6= βF ). The difference in the
constants yields the difference in average wages if a networked and a formally hired worker had
Xi = 0. The difference in the β-parameters represents how the returns to different observable
wage determinants vary depending on the hiring channel. The observed dichotomous realization
(Hi) of the latent variable H∗i determining the hiring channel of individual i has the following
form:
Hi =
 1 if H
∗
i > 0
0 otherwise
(16)
As in any model entailing latent variables, it is necessary to take care of identification.
Endogenous switching models are identified by construction through non-linearities introduced
by the selection equation (15). However, the goodness of estimations completely relies on the
parametric assumptions about the distribution of error terms. Therefore, it is often preferred
to add one or more exclusion restrictions. They are imposed by the researcher, based on her
economic intuition. By their very nature, exclusion restrictions are not testable, but indirectly.
Therefore, Zi may include some or all variables in Xi, plus at least one additional variable that
is legitimately excluded in wage regressions (13) and (14).
The main assumption of FIML is that ²Fi , ²
N
i , and ui have a trivariate normal distribution,
with mean vector zero and covariance matrix Ω as follows:
Ω =

σ2u . .
σuF σ
2
F .
σuN . σ
2
N

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where σ2u is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (15), and σ
2
F and σ
2
N are
variances of the error terms in the regression equations (13) and (14,) respectively. σuF is the
covariance of ui and ²Fi , and σuF is the covariance of ui and ²
N
i . The covariance between ²
F
i
and ²Ni is not defined, as w
F
i and w
N
i are never observed for the same worker.
To see whether sample selection is endogenous or exogenous, the correlation coefficients
between residuals in each of the wage regressions and the hiring channel choice are estimated.
The correlation between residuals in equation (13) and (15) is designated by ρF :
ρF =
σuF
σuσF
(17)
and the correlation between residuals in equation (14) and (15) by ρN :
ρN =
σuN
σuσN
(18)
If the unobserved factors determining the hiring choice are not correlated with unobserved
determinants of wage, the selection is exogenous. In this case, the sorting into workers hired
through formal and informal channel is random and there is no risk of a sample selection bias.
The adoption of an endogenous switching model provides also crucial information concerning
the indirect impact of the hiring channel on wages. Indeed, the switching model estimates
a full set of interaction terms between the hiring channel of each worker and the impact of
education, experience, and the other regressors in the wage equations. Therefore, for each
wage determinant it is possible to assess whether its impact is dependent or independent of the
channel whereby workers were hired. The combination of the switching impact of observable
determinants of wage and the unobserved factors allows to draw a conclusion concerning the
existence of a wage penalty or premium to workers hired through social networks.
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Variables Description
Firms:
Sector Categorical variable indicating the manufacturing sector to
which a firm belongs
Location Dummy variable indicating whether a firm is located in
Dakar or elsewhere
Public firms Dummy variable categorizing a firm as public if more than
45% of its capital belongs to State
Owner and director Dummy variable indicating whether the owner of a firm is
also its director or manager
Mainly informal hiring channels Number of firms that declared to mainly hire through infor-
mal channels
Number of employees Number of employees working in a firm
Workers:
Education Number of years of education
Previous experience Number of year of experience before being hired in current
firm
Age Worker’s age at hiring time
Gender Dummy variable indicating worker’s gender
Origin Categorical variable indicating worker’s place
Marital status Dummy variable indicating whether a worker is married
Same ethnicity as firm’s head Dummy variable indicating whether a worker belongs to the
same ethnic group as the owner or the manager running the
firm
Same family as firm’s head Dummy variable indicating whether a worker belongs to the
extended family of the owner or the manager running the
firm
Job Categorical variable indicating the type of job for which a
worker was hired
Hours worked Number of hours worked per week
Ln real monthly salary Natural logarithm of worker’s monthly salary when she was
hired, adjusted for HCPI
Hiring channel Dummy variable stating whether a worker was hired through
social network
Table 6: Description of variables used in the empirical analysis (sections 2 and 4).
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